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Since about 1990, a signiﬁcant number of industrialized and middle-income
countries have adopted inﬂation targeting as their framework for making
monetary policy. As the name suggests, in an inﬂation-targeting regime the
central bank is responsible for achieving a publicly announced objective for
the inﬂation rate, typically at a medium-term horizon of one to three years.
Under “ﬂexible” inﬂation-targeting regimes, now the norm in practice, cen-
tral banks are able to pursue other objectives as well, such as output stabi-
lization, as long as the inﬂation objective is achieved in the long run. Inﬂa-
tion-targeting central banks have also typically placed a heavy emphasis on
communication, transparency, and accountability; indeed, the announce-
ment of the inﬂation target is itself motivated in large part as a means of
clarifying the central bank’s objectives and plans for the public.
Countries that have adopted inﬂation targeting have generally experi-
enced good macroeconomic outcomes, including low inﬂation and stable
economic growth; and, as already noted, this approach has diﬀused
around the globe. However, despite more than a decade of experience, im-
portant questions about inﬂation targeting remain unanswered. Among
these are the following:
1. To what extent does inﬂation targeting, as practiced, correspond to
an optimal form of monetary policy? Or, to put the question another way,
could the framework of inﬂation targeting be redesigned in ways that
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strictly forward looking—that is, should it be interpreted as inﬂation-
forecast targeting—or should current and lagged values of inﬂation and
other variables aﬀect the policy setting? Should central banks attempt to
target inﬂation or the price level? Is there any theoretical reason to expect
the enhanced communication aspect of inﬂation targeting to improve pol-
icy outcomes?
2. To what extent are the improvements in performance observed in
countries that have adopted inﬂation targeting the direct result of the
change in policy regime, as opposed to other causes? For example, many
countries that did not adopt inﬂation targeting, or adopted only parts of
the approach, also experienced substantial improvements in macroeco-
nomic performance in the 1990s. Would these countries have done better if
they had adopted full-ﬂedged inﬂation targeting? Would the inﬂation-
targeting countries have done as well if they had not gone the inﬂation-
targeting route? Are there certain preconditions for inﬂation targeting to
be helpful? Are there institutional or economic circumstances under which
adopting inﬂation targeting can be counterproductive?
3. The early adopters of inﬂation targeting, such as New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Sweden, were for the most part industrial-
ized countries. More recently, both middle-income developing countries
and transition economies have begun to experiment with this approach.
Are these countries “ready” for inﬂation targeting, or would they be better
advised to adopt some other type of monetary regime? What special issues
does inﬂation targeting raise for developing and transition economies?
To try to answer these and other questions about inﬂation targeting, the
National Bureau of Economic Research convened a conference in Miami,
Florida, in January 2003, attended by academics, central bankers, and
other experts in monetary policy. The proceedings of this highly stimulat-
ing conference are contained in this volume. In the rest of this introduction
we give a brief overview of the keynote address and the papers that were
presented.
The volume begins with remarks delivered by Mervyn King, the incom-
ing governor of the Bank of England and longtime member of the Bank’s
Monetary Policy Committee, to open the conference. King reﬂects on the
experience with inﬂation targeting in the United Kingdom. Although he ac-
knowledges that the adoption of an inﬂation-targeting framework may not
have been essential to the great improvement in macroeconomic perfor-
mance in the United Kingdom since 1992, King argues that this framework
at least made making the right decisions easier. He reviews the implemen-
tation of inﬂation targeting at the Bank of England and discusses what he
sees as the important advantages of the approach. These include both a sub-
stantial increase in the professionalism of decision making and increased
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month-to-month conduct of policy to the Bank. Finally, he argues that in-
ﬂation targeting should be viewed as “a way of thinking about policy”
rather than as “an automatic answer to all the diﬃcult policy questions.”
This insight proves to be a recurrent theme of the papers in this volume.
The papers from the conference fall naturally into three groups. The ﬁrst
set of papers considers the optimal formulation of an inﬂation-targeting
policy. Indeed, King argues in his opening remarks that inﬂation targeting
should be conceived of as “a way of implementing the optimal policy reac-
tion function.” Taking this charge seriously, the ﬁrst group of papers ex-
amines how an inﬂation-targeting policy might be implemented in order to
approach this ideal.
Lars E. O. Svensson and Michael Woodford (chap. 2) present a theoret-
ical case for the view that inﬂation-forecast targeting, if conducted in an
ideal manner, is an optimal monetary policy. Their paper is concerned not
so much with the way in which inﬂation and other variables should evolve
under an optimal policy—although a position on that question is a neces-
sary starting point for their analysis—but rather with the question of the
implementation of optimal policy, by which they mean the design of a de-
cision procedure for policy that can be expected to bring about the desired
equilibrium. They argue that an inﬂation-forecast targeting procedure can
be designed that not only is consistent with an optimal equilibrium but also
represents a desirable approach to implementation. Under such a proce-
dure, the central bank considers in each decision cycle how its instrument
must be set in order for the central bank’s current projections regarding the
future evolution of inﬂation and other variables to satisfy a certain target
criterion, which deﬁnes what it means for policy to be “on track.”
The authors judge alternative approaches to implementation according
to several criteria. These include the transparency of the connection be-
tween the public description of the policy rule and ultimate policy goals;
the robustness of the policy rule to model perturbations; and the degree to
which a given policy rule excludes the possibility of alternative, much less
desirable equilibria that arise as a result of self-fulﬁlling expectations. They
argue that forecast-targeting procedures are especially desirable ap-
proaches to the implementation of optimal policy on the ﬁrst two grounds.
Determinacy of equilibrium is less easily ensured under such procedures
than under commitment to a backward-looking instrument rule in the
spirit of the Taylor rule; however, Svensson and Woodford argue that it is
possible to design a “hybrid” procedure—under which the central bank
commits itself to respond in a backward-looking way to departures of the
economy’s actual evolution from the desired equilibrium but follows a fore-
cast-targeting procedure otherwise—that retains the transparency and ro-
bustness of a targeting procedure while ensuring determinacy of equilib-
rium as well.
Introduction 3Svensson and Woodford compare alternative approaches to the imple-
mentation of optimal policy in the context of a relatively simple “New
Keynesian” model of the monetary transmission mechanism. Marc P.
Giannoni and Michael Woodford (chap. 3) complement their analysis by
discussing the form of the optimal target criterion in a range of more com-
plicated models that introduce features found in many estimated models of
the monetary transmission mechanism with optimizing foundations. They
consider the question of which variables should be taken into account (in
addition to the inﬂation projection) in an optimal target criterion. They
also show what determines the appropriate relative weights that should be
placed on various variables, the relative weights that should be placed on
projections for diﬀerent future horizons, and the degree to which the opti-
mal target criterion should be history dependent. The main point of their
paper is to show how the nature of the optimal target criterion varies de-
pending on one’s beliefs about the correct structural model of the mone-
tary transmission mechanism, and on the numerical values assigned to the
parameters of one’s model.
Giannoni and Woodford illustrate their approach by estimating a small
quantitative model of the U.S. monetary transmission mechanism and
computing an optimal targeting procedure for the estimated model. Like a
number of other recent empirical models, their estimated model incorpo-
rates staggering of both wages and prices; indexation of both wages and
prices to a lagged price index; predetermined wages, prices, and real private
expenditure for one quarter following an unexpected change in monetary
policy; and habit persistence. The optimal policy rule is found to corre-
spond to a multistage inﬂation-forecast targeting procedure. Under the op-
timal procedure, the degree of projected future inﬂation that should be ac-
ceptable depends on the central bank’s current projections for future real
wages and real activity (relative to a time-varying natural rate of output)
and also on past projections. The degree to which actual U.S. policy over
the past two decades would have conformed to the optimal target criteria
is considered, on the assumption that projections at each point in time
would have corresponded to the forecasts implied by a small, unrestricted
vector autoregression (VAR) model. Some systematic departures of actual
policy from the optimal criteria are identiﬁed, but these seem to have been
relatively modest over the period in question.
Steven G. Cecchetti and Junhan Kim (chap. 4) consider a particular is-
sue in the design of an optimal targeting regime, namely, the degree to
which overshoots of the long-run target inﬂation rate should be followed
by intentional undershoots, in order to “undo” part or all of the undesired
increase in prices. Under a simple (purely forward-looking) inﬂation target
of the kind presumed in much theoretical discussion of inﬂation targeting,
as well as typically used in practice, the central bank “lets bygones be by-
gones” by setting an inﬂation target that is independent of past successes
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central bank would seek to keep the price level near some preannounced
target path that rises deterministically at the long-run target inﬂation
rate. The latter approach would require that excess inﬂation eventually be
completely reversed, in order for the price level not to remain permanently
away from the target path.
Cecchetti and Kim deﬁne a class of “hybrid” targeting rules that nests
the extremes of pure inﬂation targeting and pure price-path targeting as
polar cases. They assume that the central bank is assigned a quadratic loss
function that it is expected to seek to minimize in a discretionary fashion.
The loss function includes both an output-gap stabilization objective and
a term proportional to squared deviations of the actual price level from a
time-varying target, which is a weighted average of the previous actual
price level and the previous target, increased by the long-run inﬂation tar-
get. Cecchetti and Kim consider which objective in this family would be
best to assign to a central bank, from the point of view of minimizing a true
social welfare function that penalizes both inﬂation and output-gap vari-
ability but assigns no intrinsic signiﬁcance to the stationarity of the ab-
solute price level. A stabilization objective other than pure inﬂation tar-
geting may nonetheless be optimal because of the suboptimality of the
discretionary equilibrium from the point of view of the loss function as-
signed to the central bank.
Cecchetti and Kim characterize the optimal hybrid central-bank objec-
tive as a function of model parameters and then estimate the relevant pa-
rameters for twenty-three countries. They conclude that a hybrid rule that
is fairly close to price-path targeting would be optimal for most of the
countries in their sample. As between the simple alternatives of pure inﬂa-
tion targeting and pure price-path targeting, they argue for the desirability
of price-path targeting, not only because their estimated parameter values
imply that it would be better for most countries but also because their nu-
merical analysis indicates that price-path targeting is a more robust choice
against variation in the values of the estimated parameters.
The papers just mentioned all consider the implications of alternative
approaches to the conduct of monetary policy under the assumption of ra-
tional expectations on the part of the private sector. Athanasios Orphan-
ides and John C. Williams (chap. 5) instead consider the important practi-
cal question of the extent to which performance under a given policy rule
may deteriorate if people do not have rational expectations but must base
their forecasts on extrapolation from the statistical patterns that they have
already observed. They then ask how a concern for robustness against this
kind of imperfect knowledge should modify the recommendations that are
made for the conduct of monetary policy.
In the context of a simple model of the inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ, Or-
phanides and Williams ﬁnd not only that the degree to which it is possible
Introduction 5for the central bank to stabilize inﬂation and the output gap is reduced in
the case of imperfect knowledge on the part of the private sector, but also
that the same policies are no longer optimal. In particular, they ﬁnd that
the optimal policy (in the case of particular assumed relative weights on
the two stabilization goals) allows less response of inﬂation to cost-push
shocks than would be optimal in the case of rational expectations. When
the private sector forms its inﬂation expectations by estimating a regres-
sion model of inﬂation dynamics using recently observed data, allowing
inﬂation to rise temporarily in response to a cost-push shock runs the risk
of being (incorrectly) interpreted by private agents as an indication of a
higher long-run average rate of inﬂation. It is therefore necessary for the
central bank to target inﬂation more tightly than would be optimal under
rational expectations, in order to prevent the losses that would result from
allowing inﬂation expectations to drift. A conclusion that can be drawn
from this analysis is that “stricter” inﬂation targeting is more appropriate
in the case of economies where central-bank credibility has not yet been
established.
The results of Orphanides and Williams also shed light on the question
of why a public inﬂation target is desirable, rather than simply letting the
public infer the central bank’s policy commitments from its observed be-
havior. Orphanides and Williams show that when private agents are as-
sumed to know the long-run average inﬂation rate associated with central
bank policy (i.e., the central bank’s long-run inﬂation target), rather than
having to estimate it—although they still must estimate the dynamics of
transitory departures from this long-run target—a more favorable trade-
oﬀ between inﬂation and output-gap variability becomes attainable.
Hence announcement of an inﬂation target—if it can be made credible to
the private sector that the announced target represents the central bank’s
true goal—can improve macroeconomic performance, by anchoring inﬂa-
tion expectations to a greater extent in the face of short-run ﬂuctuations in
inﬂation due to cost-push shocks. The model of Orphanides and Williams
thus provides theoretical results regarding the beneﬁts of an explicit inﬂa-
tion target that are consistent with the experience that Mervyn King em-
phasizes in his remarks about the United Kingdom.
The second group of papers oﬀers critical evaluations of inﬂation tar-
geting as a general approach, especially as it has been implemented in
practice thus far. Laurence Ball and Niamh Sheridan (chap. 6) compare
the macroeconomic performance of inﬂation-targeting and non-inﬂation-
targeting countries. Speciﬁcally, they compare seven OECD countries
that adopted inﬂation targeting in the early 1990s with thirteen that did
not, with respect to the behavior of inﬂation, output, and interest rates.
Many commentators have remarked upon the substantial, sustained re-
ductions in both the average level and the volatility of inﬂation by the
inﬂation-targeting countries during the 1990s, as well as the fact that this
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the real economy, and proposed these achievements as testimony to the
beneﬁts of inﬂation targeting as a monetary policy strategy. Ball and
Sheridan, however,  ﬁnd that macroeconomic performance improved
along similar dimensions for both targeters and nontargeters over this pe-
riod of time, leading them to suggest that some of the improvements in
macroeconomic stability in the inﬂation-targeting countries may have
been unrelated to the adoption of inﬂation targeting. In particular, once
they control for initial macroeconomic conditions (such as higher inﬂa-
tion, on average, in the countries that adopted inﬂation targeting), they
ﬁnd little evidence of greater improvement due to the adoption of inﬂation
targeting. To the extent that they ﬁnd greater absolute improvements in
performance in inﬂation-targeting countries, they ascribe the result to
“mean reversion”: that is, these countries typically had worse initial con-
ditions and thus were likely to improve more than countries that were in
better shape at the beginning of the sample, independent of choice of pol-
icy regime.
These results indicate that some caution in interpreting the experience
with inﬂation targeting thus far is appropriate. The proper interpretation
of the results of Ball and Sheridan will doubtless be the subject of consid-
erable further debate. As Gertler notes in his comment, it is arguable that
a number of the non-inﬂation-targeting countries also changed their mon-
etary policies in substantial ways in the 1990s, in respects that may have in-
volved important features of inﬂation targeting, even if these countries did
not have oﬃcial inﬂation targets. (As argued by Goodfriend in this volume,
the United States has adopted a number of features of inﬂation targeting
in recent years.) Disentangling the diﬀerent aspects of a given country’s
monetary policy regime in a way that can clarify which elements are most
important in achieving better performance will be an important topic for
further study.
Christopher A. Sims (chap. 7) cautions against dangers that may result
from prescribing inﬂation targeting as an approach to monetary policy
without regard to a country’s ﬁscal situation and to the degree of inde-
pendence of the central bank. A monetary policy rule that incorporates a
target for inﬂation, and that commits the central bank to vigorous reaction
to departures from the target inﬂation rate (as under the Taylor rule), will
not necessarily result in an equilibrium in which inﬂation remains near the
target rate. Under certain assumptions about ﬁscal policy and about the
connection between the respective balance sheets of the central bank and
the government, such a monetary rule may fail to prevent the existence of
other equilibria (such as self-fulﬁlling deﬂations) or may even require the
equilibrium inﬂation rate to diverge from the target rate (in a hyperinﬂa-
tionary spiral).
Sims argues, as a result, that inﬂation targeting may be least useful in ex-
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ﬂation in the past; it should therefore not be oversold as a general solution
to the problem of chronic inﬂation. In drawing attention to the importance
of a suitable institutional framework and ﬁscal position for the success of
an inﬂation-targeting rule, the paper echoes an important theme of the
work by Jonas and Mishkin (discussed below) as well. This need not mean
that inﬂation targeting should remain a fashion suited only to countries
with few serious problems of macroeconomic stability to begin with. But a
complete theory will surely place inﬂation targeting within the context of a
broader program of institutional and policy reform, and the proper target
criterion for an inﬂation-targeting central bank is unlikely to be indepen-
dent, in this more general theory, of the degree of success that can be an-
ticipated in reforming other aspects of policy.
Marvin Goodfriend (chap. 8) considers the case for adoption of inﬂation
targeting in the United States. He argues that in several important senses
the Federal Reserve already practices “implicit inﬂation targeting.” Under
Chairman Greenspan, the Fed clearly assigns priority to maintaining a low
and stable inﬂation rate; it has achieved considerable credibility in this re-
gard, and as a result of this credibility the Fed has gained ﬂexibility in sta-
bilizing the real economy without losing control of inﬂation. Nonetheless,
Goodfriend argues that it would be desirable for the Fed to make its com-
mitment to maintaining a low inﬂation rate more explicit. This would help
to ensure that the credibility achieved by the Fed under the leadership of
Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan can be maintained through changes of
personnel and improve the democratic accountability of the Fed as well.
Finally, Goodfriend considers practical aspects of the way in which inﬂa-
tion targeting could be adopted in the United States given the current leg-
islative mandate of the Fed, and he also addresses practical objections to
the adoption of inﬂation targeting—arguing, for example, that such a com-
mitment would not prevent the Fed from pursuing an eﬃcient counter-
cyclical stabilization policy.
In his comment on Goodfriend’s paper, Kohn presents a skeptical view
of the need for inﬂation targeting in the United States at this time. While
Kohn agrees that the Fed’s accumulation of credibility for maintenance of
low inﬂation has been a very positive development, he denies that current
policy is properly characterized as implicit inﬂation targeting, and he ar-
gues that adoption of explicit inﬂation targeting would substantially re-
strict the ﬂexibility that has been essential to the success of recent U.S. pol-
icy. In his view, the Fed’s current approach has already achieved the main
beneﬁts of inﬂation targeting (such as successful anchoring of inﬂation
expectations) without any need for the straitjacket of a formal inﬂation
target, and it would be wise to continue an approach that has worked well
thus far.
These contrasting briefs—each presented by one of the most articulate
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tral issues that must be addressed in evaluating the potential of inﬂation
targeting. How important are explicit as opposed to implicit commitments
on the part of a central bank? How important is ﬂexibility, and can ﬂexi-
bility of the crucial sort be reconciled with the existence of an explicit tar-
get for policy, if the nature of the commitment to that target is properly de-
ﬁned? These are critical issues for further analysis, and further reﬂection
upon the experiences of central bankers in the United States and elsewhere
will surely play an important role in settling them.
The third and ﬁnal group of papers concerns the special problems of
monetary policy in emerging markets. Jiri Jonas and Frederic S. Mishkin
(chap. 9) examine the experiences of three transition economies that have
recently adopted inﬂation targets: the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hun-
gary. Transition economies such as these have a number of unusual fea-
tures that pose special problems for the conduct of inﬂation targeting. The
economies are in the midst of radical restructuring. They are new democ-
racies, and relations between the government and the central bank in par-
ticular are not yet clearly deﬁned. Furthermore, they are about to join the
European Union and are thus prospective future members of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU); the requirements for entry to EMU thus
pose additional constraints on the conduct of monetary policy. While these
special circumstances make inﬂation targeting more diﬃcult in these
countries, and the three countries have often missed their targets by large
margins, Jonas and Mishkin ﬁnd that the strategy has been relatively suc-
cessful in bringing about disinﬂation, and they argue that other possible
strategies for inﬂation control would also be at least as problematic under
these circumstances. Hence they remain optimistic about the usefulness of
inﬂation targeting as a strategy for transition economies.
Several lessons are proposed regarding the appropriate conduct of inﬂa-
tion targeting by transition economies. Jonas and Mishkin argue that it is
more than usually important in these economies that the central bank
avoid undershooting (as well as overshooting) its inﬂation target, in order
not to endanger the fragile political support for the central bank. It is also
especially important in these economies that the inﬂation target be deﬁned
as a medium-term objective, allowing room for substantial short-run de-
partures from the medium-term target in response to unforeseen shocks,
and that the central bank be able to communicate eﬀectively with the pub-
lic about the goals of inﬂation targeting, the limits of what it can achieve,
and the reasons for the target misses that occur.
Ricardo J. Caballero and Arvind Krishnamurthy (chap. 10) are con-
cerned with special problems resulting from the vulnerability of emerging-
market economies to volatile international capital ﬂows—speciﬁcally, to
the occurrence of “sudden stops,” in which foreign lenders are suddenly
unwilling to lend to the country at any interest rate. They present a model
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itself in advance will choose to use monetary policy to defend the value of
its currency too aggressively when a sudden stop occurs. That is, after the
fact, the central bank will exhibit “fear of ﬂoating.” However, this policy is
distinctly suboptimal relative to the best policy under commitment. The
optimal state-contingent commitment from an ex ante point of view would
instead provide the private sector with a greater incentive to accumulate
foreign-currency assets (or reduce foreign-currency borrowing), by allow-
ing foreign-currency assets to increase in value (in terms of the domestic
currency) during the crisis.
Caballero and Krishnamurthy show that a central bank operating under
discretion can be induced to behave in a more desirable way if it is assigned
a state-contingent inﬂation target (rather than a constant target) or if the
inﬂation target is deﬁned in terms of a measure of inﬂation that assigns
greater weight to the prices of nontraded goods. That is, an appropriate ex
ante inﬂation target may help to ameliorate the eﬀects of sudden stops and
steer the economy and the central bank away from the inferior fear-of-
ﬂoating equilibrium. The paper also contributes to theoretical discussion
of the appropriate price index to target in the case of an open economy, an
important issue in the theory of inﬂation targeting for advanced economies
as well.
To conclude this introduction, we return to Mervyn King’s point that in-
ﬂation targeting should be viewed as “a way of thinking about policy”
rather than “an automatic answer to all the diﬃcult policy questions.” Or,
as Ben Bernanke and Frederic Mishkin put it in an early essay on the sub-
ject, inﬂation targeting is “a framework, not a rule.” Inﬂation targeting of-
fers a number of the basic elements of a successful monetary policy frame-
work, including a clearly deﬁned nominal anchor, a coherent approach
to decision making, the ﬂexibility to respond to unanticipated shocks,
and a strategy for communicating with the public and ﬁnancial markets.
However, as in any other framework, making good policy requires sensitiv-
ity to the speciﬁc economic and institutional environment in which policy-
makers ﬁnd themselves, as well as the technical capability to modify and
adapt the framework as needed. We hope that the research contained in
this volume will be useful to monetary policymakers and their staﬀ in their
eﬀorts to achieve economic stability.
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